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+# RFC-0014: Secure Relay Protocol
+
+## Overview
+The Secure Relay Protocol (Layer 2) enables private, onion-routed communication within the Libertaria network. It upgrades the transport layer with privacy-preserving encryption, forward secrecy, and session binding.
+
+## 1. Cryptographic Primitive
+- **Encryption:** `XChaCha20-Poly1305` (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data).
+- **Key Exchange:** `X25519` (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) for ephemeral shared secrets.
+- **Forward Secrecy:** Yes. Each circuit uses ephemeral keys.
+
+## 2. Session Binding & Usage
+
+### 2.1 The "Sticky" Session
+To balance privacy with network health (spam protection), sessions are **pseudo-anonymous but stable**.
+- **Session ID:** 16 bytes. Generated randomly by the **Client** (Initiator).
+- **Stickiness:** Packets within a context flow re-use the Session ID.
+- **Privacy:** Routers see only the Session ID (for rate-limiting) but cannot correlate it to a user Identity (DID) without owning the private key.
+
+### 2.2 Nonce Construction
+Strict binding of Session ID to the Encryption Nonce prevents replay and context-confusion attacks.
+**Warning:** The protocol **REJECTS** any packet where the nonce does not match the session.
+
+**Nonce Format (24 bytes):**
+```
+| Session ID (16 bytes) | Counter/Random (8 bytes) |
+```
+- **Byte 0-15:** MUST match the declared Session ID.
+- **Byte 16-23:** Monotonically increasing counter or random salt (Client controlled).
+
+### 2.3 Key Management
+- **Relay Keys:** Public X25519 keys are distributed via the DHT/Federation (`dht_nodes` message).
+- **Circuit Keys:** Ephemeral keys are generated per circuit (or per packet in stateless mode).
+- **Optimization:** Sticky Sessions allow reusing the Ephemeral Key Pair for multiple packets, reducing ECDH overhead for high-throughput flows.
+
+## 3. Wire Format (RelayPacket)
+```zig
+struct RelayPacket {
+    ephemeral_key: [32]u8, // Network Byte Order
+    nonce:         [24]u8, // [SessionID (16) | Rand (8)]
+    ciphertext:    []u8,   // Encrypted [NextHop + Payload]
+}
+```
+
+## 4. Privacy Considerations
+- **Timestamp Leakage:** The protocol deliberately **excludes** unencrypted timestamps in the header to prevent traffic correlation attacks.
+- **Client Sovereignty:** The Client generates the Session ID. Bridges/Guards cannot force a tracking ID onto the client.
+- **Verification:** Relays verify the Tag (Poly1305) and Session Binding before forwarding.
+
diff --git a/docs/RFC-0105_Sovereign_Time_Protocol.md b/docs/RFC-0105_Sovereign_Time_Protocol.md
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+# RFC-0105: Sovereign Time Protocol (STP)
+
+## Overview
+The Sovereign Time Protocol (STP) defines the temporal dimension of the Libertaria network. It rejects the limitations of relative system ticks in favor of a sovereign, absolute, and ultra-high-precision time coordinate system.
+
+## 1. Sovereign Timestamp
+Time is represented as **Attoseconds (10^-18 s)** since an absolute **Anchor Epoch**.
+- **Type:** `u128` (128-bit unsigned integer).
+- **Range:** ~10^21 years (exceeds Heat Death of the Universe).
+- **Precision:** Sub-atomic timescale precision.
+
+### 1.1 Anchor Epochs
+To allow interoperability with legacy systems ("The Old World") and objective reality, STP supports multiple anchors:
+- `Unix1970`: 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (Legacy compatibility).
+- `BitcoinGenesis`: 2009-01-03 18:15:05 UTC (The Immutable Anchor).
+- `SystemBoot`: Monotonic relative time (Local/Ephemeral).
+- `GPSEpoch`: 1980-01-06 (Precision GNSS).
+
+## 2. Temporal Epochs (Discretized Time)
+To facilitate synchronization, key rotation, and periodic maintainence without central coordination, time is divided into **Epochs**.
+
+### 2.1 Definition
+An **Epoch** is a fixed duration slice of the timeline.
+- **Duration:** 1 Hour (`3600` seconds).
+- **Boundary:** Aligned to the Anchor. (e.g., Top of the hour).
+
+### 2.2 Usage
+Epochs serve as the heartbeat of the Sovereign Node:
+1.  **Key Rotation:** Ephemeral encryption keys expire at Epoch boundaries.
+2.  **Session Renewal:** Long-lived sessions must re-handshake every $N$ epochs.
+3.  **Cron Scheduling:** Nodes use `Epoch.timeRemaining()` to sleep efficiently until the next synchronization window.
+4.  **Rate Limiting:** Resource quotas are reset per Epoch.
+
+### 2.3 Implementation
+```zig
+const time = @import("l0-transport/time.zig");
+const now = time.SovereignTimestamp.now();
+const epoch = time.Epoch.fromTimestamp(now);
+
+// Check if we need to rotate keys
+if (epoch.index > last_rotation_epoch) {
+    rotateKeys();
+}
+
+// Sleep until next epoch
+const sleep_duration = epoch.timeRemaining(now);
+```
+
+## 3. Wire Format
+- **SovereignTimestamp:** 17 bytes (`u128` + `u8` Anchor).
+- **CompactTimestamp:** 9 bytes (`u64` nanoseconds + `u8` Anchor) - used for Kenya devices (IoT).
+